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ABSTRACT
Black Box Analysis of Android Malware Detectors
by Guruswamy Nellaivadivelu
Code obfuscation can make it challenging to detect malware in Android devices.
Malware writers obfuscate the code of their programs by employing various techniques
that attempt to hide the true purpose of the program. Malware detectors can use
a number of features to classify a program as a malware. If the malware detector
uses a feature that is obfuscated, then the malware detector will likely fail to classify
the malware as malicious software. In this research, we obfuscate selected features of
known malware and determine whether the malware can still be detected by a given
detector. Using this approach, we show that we can effectively perform black box
analysis of various malware detectors.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The volume of Android malware is increasing exponentially. Indeed, in the second
quarter of 2016, 3.5 million samples of Android malware were detected [1]. This rapid
increase in Android malware has placed the focus on Android security and made
it imperative to develop more efficient defensive tools for combating such malware.
One of the challenges faced in this area is the use of code obfuscation techniques.
Code obfuscation is a method of altering code to hide its actual purpose, without
significantly altering its performance. There are many ways of obfuscating source
code in an Android environment. Several software applications that are available
off the shelf can be used to achieve different levels of code obfuscation [2]. In order
to address the problem of strengthening malware detector’s strength, there are two
fundamental questions that need to be addressed, as highlighted by Christodorescu
et al. [3]. The first question is to gauge the resilience of a malware detector against
code obfuscation. This will also help us in understanding the strength of the malware
detetctor in detecting variants of known malware families. The other question is
the possibility of identifying the detection algorithm used by a malware detector.
By studying the behavior of malware detectors and how they respond to different
obfuscation techniques, a malware writer can uncover ways to beat the antivirus
program. Ultimately, we want to gauge how well a malware detector will perform
against obfuscated code.
Code obfuscation is the process by which source code is manipulated to hide its
true intentions. Code obfuscation is increasingly becoming a common tool to avoid
detection by traditional malware detectors. There are many different types of code
obfuscation. The most basic type of code obfuscation involves the encryption of all
the strings that are used in the code. This overrides the detection mechanism of
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most of the traditional malware detectors. Some advanced malware detectors account
for this encryption and are able to identify malware files. There are a host of other
obfuscation techniques that can be employed by malware writers. Some of these
include the obfuscation of function calls, permission hiding, and insertion of dead code.
The challenges associated with code obfuscation primarily deal with the problem
of maintaining the core functionality of the code, while making it difficult for malware
detectors to detect their true purpose. This challenge becomes easier for malware
writers when dealing with Android malware. The reason for this is associated with
the permission levels of applications running on Android platform. Unlike anti-
virus programs that run on computers, the Android system provides the same set
of permission levels to the anti-virus application and the application that is being
scanned. This is a major limitation for malware detector writers. With the advent of
sophisticated encryption techniques, it has become very difficult to different between
benign and malicious applications of obfuscation techniques. The primary objective of
this project is to make malware detectors more responsive to the code obfuscation
techniques employed by malware writers. By doing so, we can attempt to identify the
malware features that are used by a malware detector in its classification algorithm.
We can also try and modify an existing malware detector to see if we can overcome
the limitations. In order to achieve this, we propose a theoretical approach. In this
approach, we attempt to isolate the features that contribute to malware detection.
Once, we have this information, we can attempt to modify an existing malware detector
to overcome these limitations. The malware detector should employ ‘‘de-obfuscation’’
techniques before analyzing any malware. An intelligent malware detector should be
able to sense the type of encryption or obfuscation technique being employed and use
the corresponding ‘‘de-obfuscator’’ to nullify the effects of the obfuscator.The first
2
step in this implementation will be the identification of the factors in a malware that
are taken into consideration by a malware detector. To achieve this, we will begin
by encrypting various parameters of a malware and running it through a malware
detector [4]. By following this approach, we can identify the exact scenario when a
malware is no longer classified as a malware by our malware detector. Once we identify
the features that are required by a malware detector, we will use this information to
make the malware detectors process the obfuscated part of the code as well. This will
make our malware detector more robust and improve their performance.
In Chapter 2, we look at the previous work that is done with regards to malware
detection in Android. We explore the various detection mechanisms and approaches
that has been discussed so far. After looking at the background work, we delve into
code obfuscation in Chapter 3 and understand the basic terminologies associated with
code obfuscation. We also look at the impact of obfuscation in general, and then
more specifically, their impact on malware detectors. After understanding the basics
of code obfuscation and malware detectors, we move on to the current threats and
defenses in the Android operating system in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4, we glance at
the growing dominance of the Android operating system in the mobile phone space
and the importance of this particular operating system in our lives. The motivation
behind selecting the Android OS for this project is understandable from Chapter 4.
The obfuscators to be used in this project, and their functionalities are explained in
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 clearly lists the software requirements for this project and also
talks about the necessary technologies for setting up the experiment. The results
of the experiment are summarized in Chapter 7. The factors that contribute to the
conclusion being drawn from this experiment are detailed in Chapter 6. We finally
consolidate the results and discuss the future course of the project work in Chapter 8.
3
CHAPTER 2
Previous Work
In this chapter, we present the results of a literature survey that was performed
to identify the current state of obfuscation mechanisms and their impact to the field
of code obfuscation. We find that code obfuscation has been an area of interest in
the field of cryptography and traditionally, obfuscation techniques have been used
to achieve reverse engineering protection. On the other hand, a lot of malware have
obfuscated code to avoid detection by anti-virus programs.
2.0.1 Code Obfuscation and Malware Detectors
The efficiency of malware detectors against code obfuscation has been a point of
discussion amongst malware researchers for a very long time. A lot of research has been
done on the robustness of malware detectors against high levels of obfuscation. The
issue of malware detector’s strengths against obfuscated malware had been discussed
as early as 1996, as can be seen in the quote by S. Gordon and R. Ford [4]:
‘‘The evaluation of anti-virus software is not adequately covered by any existing
criteria based on formal methods. The process, therefore, has been carried out by
various personnel using a variety of tools and methods.’’
2.0.2 Program Obfuscation
There has been a lot of theoretical research on the different aspects of obfuscation
and on ways to improve it. Most of this research has been successful in arriving at a
conclusion on the efficiency of the cryptographic problems of encryption, authentication
and protocol [5]. But the problem of program obfuscation has remained an area within
cryptography in which theoretical research has been inadequate. In their seminal paper
on program obfuscation, Barak et al. [5] propose to represent program obfuscation
as below: An obfuscator 𝑂 is said to be an efficient compiler if it takes as input a
program 𝑃 and produces a program 𝑂(𝑃 ) and satisfies the following two conditions:
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1. Functionality: 𝑂(𝑃 ) computes the same function as 𝑃
2. ‘Virtual Black Box’property: Anything that can be efficiently computed from
𝑂(𝑃 ) can also be computed by 𝑃 .
The paper by Christodorescu et al. [3] lists various ways to test and achieve
program obfuscation in general. A detailed analysis of the various obfuscation methods
is also discussed in the paper. One interesting angle explored by the paper deals
with assigning mathematical equations to measure the effectiveness of the individual
obfuscators. This lets us quantify the different obfuscators and rank them against each
other. One of the evasion methods employed in malware obfuscation is polymorphism.
It is a method by which a program evades various detection tools by mutating into
different forms. In the paper by Rastogi et al. [6], the authors develop and propose
a framework called ‘DroidChameleon’ that provides a way to transform Android
applications into different forms with minimal user involvement. As shown in Figure 1,
the authors apply various transformations on a malware sample dataset. The output
of all these transformations are processed by a malware detector (referred here as
Anti-malware). The input to the anti-malware is processed sequentially. After each
Figure 1: Evaluating anti-malware
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transformation, the anti-malware‘s output is evaluated and if the malware detection
fails, the next level of transformation is applied. This helps rank the various malware
detectors against each other for accurate analysis.
2.1 Obfuscation in Android Malware
A report by Google stated that a majority of malware detectors work as a binary
classifier [7]. They classify an application as a malware or a benign file. In order to
effectively eliminate malicious applications, it is important that malware detectors
do more than just identify malware. They should be able to isolate the core parts of
the application that perform the malicious acts and work at fixing the loopholes that
let the program act in a malicious way. More recent malware applications employ a
variety of tricks, in addition to traditional code obfuscation mechanisms. For instance,
a variant of Android malware, known as Android/BadAccent, is a known banking
Trojan, that steals credentials used in banking applications [8]. A variant of this
malware used a mechanism known as ‘Tapjacking’ to extract the credentials from the
users. In this form of attack, a screen is displayed to the user, while a second screen
is hidden behind the actual visible display [9]. When a user clicks a button on the
screen, assuming it to be the one that is displayed, the underlying screen gathers the
input and processes the command. This is a common method of gathering details
from unsuspecting users.
2.1.1 Statistical Anaylsis Techniques and Android Malware
One widely used approach for analyzing malware samples is the usage of statistical
methods. In such methods, the Android executable file (with the extension apk), is
decompiled to get the original source code. Due to the Android operating system
being written in Java, it is easy to reverse engineer an apk file to retrieve the source
code. This opens up many opportunities for performing statistical analysis on the
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obtained raw data. This also lets a researcher perform various operations on the
source code, and then repackage it back into an apk. In the approach known as
AndroSimilar, Faruki et al. [10] propose a new algorithm known as AndroSimilar, that
takes into consideration various features that are known to be present in malware
alone. The AndroSimiar approach [10], as shown in Figure 2, decompiles an apk file
and repackages it after feature extraction. To extract the features, the algorithm
incorporates apps from the Google Playstore and other third party applications. These
features are normalized and fed into a signature generation engine, that provides a
unique signature for each malware. This is used as reference for detecting future
malware applications.
Figure 2: AndroSimilar
2.2 Conclusion
Malware in mobile devices is no longer a problem confined to labs and research
areas. The rapid increase in access to computers has helped malware writers create
specific, targeted programs that perform with high efficiency and exploit vulnerabilities
in different operating systems. The amount of research being done in malware analysis
and, more specifically, in Android malware, is in the right direction. In the fight
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against sophisticated metamorphic malware, it is imperative that the malware detector
is better than the malware creator. In this paper, we have explored various work, that
dealt with the different aspects of malware obfuscation and ways to overcome the
shortcomings in today’s version of malware detectors. The future of malware looks
very bright and it is hoped that the malware detectors of the future will be up to the
task at hand.
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CHAPTER 3
Code Obfuscation
Code Obfuscation is a technique by which programmers have deliberately sought
to make the functionality of their code less obvious. This technique has been used
by programmers to achieve various additional objectives. Code obfuscation can
be used to achieve a myraid of objectives. These include prevention of reverse
engineering, protection of intellectual property, and reducing the size of an executable.
In some benign scenarios, an executable is obfuscated to protect the various licensing
mechanisms used in them. Obfuscators are also a good way to restrict unauthorized
access to files by people who might try to use dubious tools to incorporate malicious
code into files.
We will look at the history of code obfuscation to appreciate the relevance of
code obfuscation in today’s software development perspective. With growing interest
in various obfuscation techniques, and the ease of availability of obfuscators dedicated
to different operating systems, this would help us in understanding the rapid growth
in this area and appreciate the urgent need for various countermeasures against this
approach.
3.1 Growth of Obfuscation in Software Development
Code obfuscation has been historically associated with malware development,
than with benign software development. Some of the earliest examples of attempts
at obfuscation in malware can be found in the ‘‘Brain Virus’’ . In this variant of
the malware, the malicious program would display unaffected disk partitions to users
attempting to access partitions that the virus had corrupted. Although the code in
itself was not encrypted, the behavior of the virus shows attempts at hiding its true
usage.
In the same year, the Cascade virus was released to the world. This was an early
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variant of malware to use encryption to hide its true purpose. The earliest strains
of obfuscated malware used a simple encryption-decryption routine to perform the
decryption tasks. As the malware detectors of the time were not sophisticated enough
to detect the encrypted part of the code, this simple obfuscation technique enabled a
lot of malware programs to slip away undetected. This is a serious disadvantage in
the design and implementation of malware detectors. We would be exploring more
such flaws with the implementation of malware detectors in this project.
With the advent of advanced malware detectors and improvement in statistical
analysis techniques, the level of obfuscation in malware increased. Polymorphic
malware uses a very high level of encryption technique to obfuscate its contents. A
polymorphic malware changes the encryption in itself and provides very few traces
of a signature. If a malware is truly polymorphic, then there will be no consistency
between any two iterations of the same program and it would be virtually impossible
to detect them using traditional signature matching techniques.
3.2 Malware Detectors
Malware detectors came into existence with the advent of different malicious
programs. Before the rapid growth of the internet, malware detectors were only
capable of performing scans based on signatures of known virus programs. This static
analysis technique meant that new virus would be out in the wild for some time before
the malware definitions of the individual anti virus programs could be updated. With
the introduction of the world wide web, the antivirus industry expanded into dynamic
analysis and cloud based malware detectors. Firewalls, online scanning, and virtual
machines started being increasingly used to identify malware. One major shortfall of
anti virus programs is their inability to detect polymorphic virus. In general, many
antivirus programs employ signature detection for identifying malware. In addition to
10
this most common approach, heuristics based detection and rootkit based detection
are also employed to detect virus programs. Along with these approaches, active
scanning approaches like on-access scanning is also used to detect programs that
might attempt unauthorized operations. We discuss these methods and detection
mechanisms in detail in this chapter.
3.2.1 Signature Based Detection
This is one of the most basic methods of malware detection that is still in use
today. When a new strain of malware is detected in the "wild", antivirus firms
analyze it and extract a "signature" from it. This signature extraction can either
be done manually or by using automated signature detection techniques [11]. Once
a signature is detected, it is updated into various malware definitions of antivirus
software. Although this method is effective against generic malware, it is highly
ineffective against oligomorphic, polymorphic and metamorphic malware. These
are variants of malware that encrypt itself with each iteration. In this project, we
attempt to identify the various factors that contribute to malware detection and their
importance in overcoming the signature detection method.
3.2.2 Heuristics Based Detection
In Heuristics based detection techniques, a single signature or pattern is used
to detect multiple malware belonging to the same family. Such techniques rely on
the fact that multiple malware are created from a single malware. Thus, successfully
creating a signature for a base family will result in the detection of all malware related
to that particular family.
3.2.3 Rootkit Detection
A rootkit is a type of software that attempts to gain administrator privileges
in a system without the knowledge of the user running it. In many cases, the
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rootkits contain software within them that becomes undetectable to antivirus programs.
Rootkits usually have full administrative access and also have the ability to hide
themselves from the list of running processes. Modern antivirus software scans for
rootkits in specific, to detect them. It is very difficult to remove a rootkit when
compared to other generic malware programs.
3.2.4 On-Access Scanning
In this method, the antivirus program looks out for any threats that might happen
on a real-time basis. The antivirus monitors the system in which it is installed and
looks for suspicious activity whenever the computer’s memory is loaded with fresh
data from the storage disks. This might happen when a USB drive is inserted, an
email attachment is opened or a even when an already existing file is opened by a
user or a program. This type of scanning is more effective as it does not rely solely on
malware definitions to detect viruses.
12
CHAPTER 4
Threats and Defenses in the Android Operating System
Before we dwell deep into code obfuscation in Android, we look at the various
malware detectors for the Android operating system. We also look at the rapid
proliferation of the Android OS and the reason for selecting Android as the focus of
study in this experiment.
4.1 Android Malware Detectors
With the rise of the Android Operating systems, the amount of malware associated
with it has also risen significantly. From a market share of 2.8 % in 2009 [12] , Android
captured about 75% of the market in 2012 [12]. As shown in figure 3 , we can see that
the growth and adoption of Android has been very steep. This rapid proliferation of
Android resulted in an equally rapid rise of Android malware.
Figure 3: Market Share of mobile operating systems
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Figure 4: Top 20 permissions in Android in 2012
With the increase in the number of Android malware being released to the wild,
their level of sophistication also increased. Android malware detectors used the number
of permissions requested by an app to determine its legitimacy. In the schematic
represented in Figure 4, Zhou et al. [13] support the fact that both, benign and
malicious applications, have very similar permission requests. Due to this, using access
requests as a measure for classifying Android applications became ineffective. All
the malware programs plaguing the Android operating system can be classified into
four categories based on the basis of their primary activity [13]. Privilege Escalation,
Remote Control, Monetary Loss, and Information Collection are the various sub
categories under which any Android malware can be classified.
4.1.1 Privilege Escalation
In this type of attack, the malicious app that is installed on a device, attempts
to grant itself additional privileges than the one it requires. This is achieved by using
known exploits in the Android operating system.
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4.1.2 Remote Control
A very high percentage of malware attempts to use the compromised device as a
remote bot. In some malware families, the remote URL that is being used to control
the device is encrypted. Such encryption makes it very difficult to detect these types
of malware and this will be a primary area of focus in this thesis.
4.1.3 Monetary Loss
A very direct way of monetizing malware is to make unsuspecting users subscribe
to services that cost a lot of money. Such services are run by the malware perpetrators
and will enable them to charge the infected devices’ owners money for services that
they are not aware of. To achieve this, some malware use the remote control to push
down numbers of services to the devices and then enroll them.
4.1.4 Information Collection
Many malware programs attempt to collect the personal information of users.
Such personally identifiable information makes it easy for scamsters to dupe people
using various other schemes. Malware belonging to this family tries to steal personal
information of the compromised device’s owner, as well as the details of people in
their contact lists. This information is then sold through different means to interested
parties.
4.2 Android Malware Detection Limitations
One of the major limitation of malware detection in Android is the limited
processing power of the devices running Android. Due to processing and memory
constraints, generic malware detection has to be restricted to static analysis techniques.
In general, all the existing Android security solutions can be classified into Static
Analysis and Dynamic Analysis [14].
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4.2.1 Static Analysis
Static Analysis is a technique in which the an application is evaluated for its
trustworthiness by disassembling and checking its source code. The application is
not executed for this analysis. Once an application is marked for scanning, various
statistical analyzing approaches are used to classify the file. Some of the most
commonly used static detection methods are discussed in the next few subsections.
4.2.1.1 Signature Based Detection
Signature based detection is a type of static analysis technique. In this method,
a virus is examined by extracting its signature and then comparing it with signatures
from known malware. The limitation of this technique is that it is incapable of
detecting unknown malware types. The signatures of known malware are stored in
a signature database. In addition to this, the signature database also requires that
it is updated constantly. Without an up-to-date signature database, most of the
prevalent malware could slip through undetected. This is difficult in the case of
Android Malware detectors as the device possess limited memory and it would be
infeasible to store all virus definitions on the device. If the virus definitions were to
be moved to a remote server, it would use up considerable amount of data traffic for
performing the validation. These are some serious limitations that hinder traditional
signature matching techniques.
4.2.1.2 Permission Based Detection
This is a straightforward approach to detecting malware in Android systems. In
this method, the number of permissions an application requires is used to determine
its classification as a malicious or a benign file. Some research has been done in this
area wherein the Android Manifest file is analyzed for extracting information [15]
about the permissions requested by the application. This information is used to assign
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a score of relevancy to the permissions requested. This score is then compared against
a threshold for determining the malicious intent of an app. There are variations to
this technique and some methods yield better results than the others. This method is
a very quick way of determining the malicious nature of applications. But a serious
limitation of this method is that it does not analyze the source code or the working of
the app. Only the Manifest file is analyzed. A lot of malware apps use permissions
similar to the benign apps. Hence, permissions based detection should be used in
conjuction with a second confirmation method to validate an app.
4.2.2 Dynamic Analysis
In this method, the application is executed and it is analyzed during the runtime.
It becomes very easy to identify sections of code or execution blocks that were missed
during the static analysis of an application. Dynamic analysis methods are also
effective against obfuscation and encryption techniques.
4.2.2.1 Anomaly Based Detection
An application is executed and the system calls generated by it are recorded in a
log. This log is then sent for analysis to a remote server, where the various behavior
of malware are recorded. Using that as a basis, the log files are analyzed, and the
results are aggregated. This result, in collaboration with other techniques are used to
classify the file as malicious or not.
4.2.2.2 Emulation Technique
Yan et al. [16] propose a technique in which a virtual machine is used to analyze
an application. In common virtual machine based detection techniques, the anti-
malware program and the malware execute in the same environment. This makes
them detectable to each other. In the platform presented by Yan et al. [16], the
antimalware, DroidScope, stays out of the execution environment and monitors the
17
execution as a whole. This enables it to detect the malware without being detected
by the malware.
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CHAPTER 5
Android Obfuscators
In this chapter, we use different obfuscators to modify parts of an android malware.
By systematically obfuscating different parts of the code, we can gain insight into
the parts which contribute most to the detection of malware. Once we have this
information, we can then determine efficient ways to make the malware detectors
more robust and be less resilient to code obfuscators.
5.1 Experiment
For this project, we use a tool called AAMO (Another Android Malware Obfus-
cator) [17]. This tool gives us various obfuscators for use with our experimentations.
The obfuscators can be used independently or in combination with other obfuscators
to increase their effectiveness. Using this tool, we decompile a android file, perform
obfuscation operations on them, and recompile the file again. In this experiment, we
use the source code provided by the developers of AAMO [17] and available at [18].
This tool forms the basis of the work presented in this thesis. The steps involved in
this are detailed below:
1. Obtain an APK file.
2. Decompile the APK file into Smali.
3. Get the list of obfuscators passed into the program.
4. Apply the obfuscators one after the other on the decompiled apk file.
5. Repackage the decompiled file into an APK.
6. Sign the APK file to maintain its integrity.
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Figure 5: Experiment flow
Performing the above steps ensures that the apk file is not corrupted and its
usage is not affected. We perform this to make it difficult for a malware detector to
detect the apk file as a malicious one. The entire flow of the experiment is depicted
in Figure 5.
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As shown in Figure 5, the final encryption would let the malicious file be signed
with a valid signature and thus eliminating any traces of the apk file having been
compromised.
5.1.1 Uses of the obfuscator
Using the obfuscator in this step has various advantages for our experiment. One
of the primary uses is to make the job of the malware detector more difficult. Since
most of the malware detectors do not take into account polymorphic and oligomorphic
malware, using obfuscators will let us know which parts of a malware factor into
the detection score computed by individual detectors. In this experiment, we use 14
obfuscators to test out the resilience of the malware detectors as listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Android Obfuscators
Count Obfuscator Name
1 Resigned
2 Alignment
3 Rebuild
4 Fields
5 Debug
6 Indirections
7 Renaming
8 Reordering
9 Goto
10 Arithmetic Branch
11 Nop
12 Lib
13 Manifest
14 Reflection
These obfuscators enable us to test the various aspects of a apk file and help us
determine the ones that are really useful to a malware detector. When a particular
obfuscator is run, it runs a function that is specific to that particular obfuscator and
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applies that function to all the parameters that match the criteria for that specific
obfuscator. Each of the obfuscator is discussed here in detail.
5.1.1.1 Resigned
This obfuscator decompiles an apk and just resigns the apk file after compilation.
Not much change is done to the application file in itself. The purpose of this obfuscator
is to attempt defeating malware detectors that try to use signatures of certain known
malware sources to classify a malicious file.
5.1.2 Alignment
This obfuscator makes use of the zipalign utility of android. Zipalign is a tool
that is used to provide optimization techniques to APK files. The tool causes all
uncompressed data within the APK to start with a particular alignment relative to the
file’s beginning. The Alignment obfuscator changes this alignment before recompiling
the apk file.
5.1.3 Rebuild
This obfuscator rebuilds the application file without performing any changes. The
unpacking and repackaging of the apk file affects the timestamp, signature of the apk
and other factors that help in identifying the origin of the file. Some smart malware
detectors are able to detect these changes and do not let the file pass through it.
5.1.4 Fields
This is a relatively simple obfuscator that just renames the fields that are used
in the application. This is done after the decompilation of the apk file. The smali is
analyzed for locating the fields that are used in the source code and these are renamed.
5.1.5 Debug
The debug obfuscator removes all information related to debug from the files.
This is performed not only on the smali file, but throughout the source code as well.
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Without the debug information, the APK file becomes slightly different from the
original file. Removal of the debug information also alters the size of the file and
makes it different.
5.1.6 Indirections
Call indirections is an advanced obfuscation method in which various function
calls are directed through different values. The obfuscator performs operations such
as changing the register count, changing a method call and also redirecting all calls to
the methods. This obfuscation completely changes the control flow of an application
and makes it difficult to detect using a comparison model in dynamic analysis as well.
5.1.7 Renaming
All the variables in the sourcecode are renamed to different values. This is exactly
like using substitutions to hide the original values. Renaming is also advantageous
when certain signature and pattern matches are based on the names of the variables
and functions.
5.1.8 Reordering
Using reordering will let us change the order of the code in the application. The
obfuscator changes the location of certain parts of the code and adjusts the calls to it
accordingly. This makes it possible to evade signature based detection methods if the
signature is based on the order of instructions or if it is based on the DEX opcodes.
5.1.9 Goto
In order to modify the control-flow structure of the application, forward and
backward jumps are inserted into the code. These unconditional jump statements will
be executed irrespective of how the program is run. This widely alters the flow and
will make it very difficult to detect using conventional methods.
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5.1.10 Arithmetic Branch
A constant value, known to the obfuscator, is used to achieve this obfuscation.
This constant value is not known to the compiler. Using this constant value, the
obfuscator is able to control the flow of execution of the program. The compiler
assumes that either of the branches could be possible as the value for deciding the flow
of control is not known. This is applied to methods with more than 2 parameters.
5.1.11 Nop
This is a classical and an easy way to obfuscate a program. In this, a "no-operation
instruction" (known as a "NOP") is inserted into the source code. The number of
such instructions inserted is randomized. These are inserted into methods to make
them bloated and delay the execution time.
5.1.12 Lib
MD5 hashing is used to rename the file and path names. A proxy method is
created and used to handle the decryption of the values, when it is required by the
system.
5.1.13 Manifest
The AndroidManifest.xml file is modified by this obfuscator. The manifest file
contains important information related to the application’s usage and permissions.
This obfuscator opens up the file and encrypts the values for the resources and also
replaces the characters in user defined identifiers.
5.1.14 Reflection
This obfuscator acts similar to the code reodering obfuscator. The reflection
obfuscator takes advantage of the Android dynamic code loading API. All the static
method calls are converted into reflection calls and the the reflect method is invoked
on a string that contains the target method’s name.
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CHAPTER 6
Experiment
6.1 Environment Setup
Due to the various different types of software used in the experiment, it is
important to have the correct version of each software installed. As shown in Figure 5,
each APK will have to be decompiled into its source code, before going through the
obfuscation process. To achieve this, we use a program called apktool[19]. A list of
various software and their versions are listed in Table 2.
Table 2: List of software required and their versions.
Number Software Version
1 Java 1.8.0_45
2 Python 2.7.11
3 Apktool 2.2.1
The given applications are interdependent on each other for this experiment. The
AAMO framework is written in Python and uses various Python libraries to execute.
The decompilation of the APK files is achieved using the Apktool. Apktool requires
a java virtual machine to execute. It is imperative that this version of Apktool be
maintained for repeating the experiments presented in this work as the source code of
AAMO has been modified to fit this version of the tool.
6.2 Dataset and Malware Detectors
In order to successfully evaluate and analyze the malware detectors various
experiments were performed using known Android malware. Once the android malware
were finalized, the obfuscators were chosen to increase the difficulty of malware
detection. A sampling was performed with a handful of malware. Using this sampling,
the obfuscators to be applied were selected and then applied to a wider dataset. The
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Figure 6: Sampling Results
results of this sampling are shown in Figure 6. In Figure 6, a sample file, ‘‘Angry Birds’’,
was used to test the effect of the various obfuscators. This file, a malicious version of
the popular game, is a Trojan variant that steals the contact information, and has
the ability to send text messages without the user’s permission. Before applying any
obfuscator, the file had a detection ratio of 0.819. When we apply the obfuscators,
the detection ratio drops steadily. In Figure 6, the x-axis represents the different
obfuscators that were used. We can see that the detection ratio almost remains
constant for all the obfuscators, except for the manifest and reorder obfuscators. The
functioning of these obfuscators are defined in chapter 5. This hints at the fact that
many malware detectors just perform an analysis on the AndroidManifest.xml file to
classify the file as a malware. Due to this, when the manifest obfuscator is applied,
the detection ratio drops. When we apply all the obfuscators on the file, the detection
ratio drops significantly. This is shown in the Figure 6’s ‘allObfuscation’ bar.
It can be seen from the results that only some obfuscators contribute effectively
to hindering the detection ratio of malware obfuscators.
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6.3 Dataset
The Contagio dataset was used to perform the various experiments in this
project [20]. All the samples used for experimentation are malicious files. The files
were classified as malicious by various means and the contagio data dump also certifies
the files as being malware.
6.3.1 Malware Files Selection
Known malicious files were used for performing the experiments in this project.
The reason for using malware for the experiments was to understand how each
obfuscator would help the malware in evading detection by malware detector. All the
test samples were caught by at least one of the malware detectors and many of the
samples were incorrectly classified as benign files, once the obfuscation was complete.
6.3.2 Other Datasets
Previously, experiments have been performed on malicious files belonging to other
datasets. Before we delve into the results of the experiment performed in this work,
we look at how obfuscators affect the detection ratio of various malware detectors.
6.4 Malware Detectors against Code Obfuscation
A single malware detector is unlikely to give us a substantial result. This is
because various malware detectors use different techniques for analyzing malware. If
a single malware detector were to be used as a benchmark, then we would either get
excellent detection scores or the malware detector would fail in a very poor way. To
overcome this shortcoming, a single obfuscated file is scanned by several malware
detectors simultaneously. Instead of manually uploading the files to different malware
detectors, we make use of VirusTotal [21] and other similar virus scanning providers.
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CHAPTER 7
Results of Experiments
The various obfuscators defined earlier were iteratively applied to malware
samples from the Contagio dataset. Based on the results obtained from VirusTotal,
the obfuscators were selected for further application.
7.1 Observations
The VirusTotal website uploads a malware file to its database and then performs
a scan using the various malware detectors associated with the website. Each uploaded
file is hashed and stored in the database to reduce duplicate efforts and minimize scan
times. Due to this behavior, each time a file is loaded into the website to be scanned,
the website will prompt if a similar file was scanned earlier. It was observed that as
the number of obfuscators employed increased, the similarity between the obfuscated
and un-obfuscated applications decreased. If more than 2 certain obfuscators were
applied, the VirusTotal website would not recognize the file as a previously recognized
file. This observation was consistent throughout the different experiments conducted.
7.2 Steps for Analyzing Malware Detectors
The experiment was performed with certain operations being repeated in an
iterative manner. The obfuscated malware files were prepared in advance. The steps
are as follows:
• Scan a malicious file using VirusTotal.
• Record the detection ratio.
• Apply obfuscator(s) on the selected malware file.
• Scan the obfuscated file using VirusTotal again.
• Record the new detection ratio.
Repeating the above steps helped us detect how robust and efficient malware
detectors are. Ideally, the malware detector should not be affected by the obfuscators.
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The detection ratio should not be very different irrespective of whether the malware
was obfsucated or not.
But the results indicated that almost all the malware files had a very high
probability of being classified as a benign file, if they had sufficient obfuscation
techniques applied to them.
7.2.1 Metrics used
We use the detection ratio provided by VirusTotal to determine the effectiveness
of the Malware Obfuscators. As expected, the malware detectors are not resilient
enough to detect variants of malware that have been slightly obfuscated.
7.3 Obfuscation of Malware Samples
The results for applying each obfuscator were collected and only the significant
results are shown here. In addition to gathering the results for an individual obfuscator,
we also get the results for the individual malware detectors. A comparison of their
behavior is also presented here.
7.3.1 Individual Obfuscators
Application of individual obfuscators did not alter the detection ratio by a huge
margin. A sample detection ratio for applying the "Renaming" obfuscator is shown
in Figure 7. As part of this experiment, 289 files were obfuscated and run through
the malware detectors. In Figure 7, the malware samples are represented on the
x-axis as alphabetic symbols. The mapping for the malware file to symbols is shown
in Appendix B. The graph shows that the average detection ratio for the renaming
obfuscator is 0.46. The average detection ratio is represented by a red line in the
graph. While there are some occasional spikes in the detection rate, that seems to be
the exception with a very few files being consistently classified as a malware.
The results for the obfuscator "Manifest" are shown in Figure 8.The detection
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Figure 7: Single Obfuscator Usage - Renaming. Average: 0.46
ratio for this obfuscator is also lesser than for a normal malware. But with applying
this obfuscator, the detection ratio is further reduced. The average detection ratio in
this case is 0.3867. This shows that the manifest obfuscator contributes more to the
detection rate. We repeat this experiment for different obfuscators to get record their
detection scores. These are included in appendix C.
7.3.1.1 Multiple Obfuscators
While individual obfuscators didn’t provide much insight into the malware
detection scores, it was observed that combining multiple obfsucators quickly decreased
the detection ratio.
In Figure 9, the obfuscators Renaming, Reordering, Goto, and Arithmetic Branch-
ing were applied to the files.
This certainly increased the obscurity of the malware files. The detection ratio
for the obfuscated files in Figure 9 is much lesser than in Figure 7. This could be
attributed to the fact that a combination of weak obfuscators is still a strong enough
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Figure 8: Single Obfuscator Usage - Manifest. Average: 0.3867
Figure 9: Detection Ratios with four obfuscators applied. Average:0.403457
challenge for malware detectors. We also note that, with a average of 0.4034, this is
only marginally better than the performance of a single manifest obfuscator as shown
in Figure 8. This further reiterates the significance of selecting the right obfuscator
rather than a combination of different obfuscators.
7.3.1.2 All Obfsucators
To make the results of the experiment certain, all the obfuscators in question
were applied to a set of files. Keeping up with the consistency observed so far, the
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Figure 10: Pre- and Post-Obfuscation Results. Average: 0.219044
detection ratio dropped by a huge margin. This can be observed in Figure 10. The
results show a average detection rate of 0.21. This is extremely low when compared
to the results obtained before any obfuscation was applied as seen in Figure 6.
This clearly shows that by increasing the number of obfuscators being applied to
a malware, we can bring down the detection ratio of that particular file to a very low
value.
7.3.1.3 Average Ratio and Summarization
To conclude the experiments, the average detection ratio was calculated for each
obfuscator and the combination of obfuscators. The results of this calculation are
shown in Figure 11.
We observe a decline in the detection ratio for the different obfuscators. The
average detection rate drops steeply when all obfuscators are combined. This is
consistent with the results obtained so far in the experiment. The presence of the
manifest obfuscator after the result of the combined four obfuscators in Figure 11
shows the importance of selecting the right obfuscator for defeating the malware
detectors.
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Figure 11: Average Detection Ratio for Different Obfuscators
7.3.2 Individual Malware Detectors
We now analyze behavior of the individual malware detectors and look at their
performance against code obfuscation. To achieve this, we perform the same experi-
ments as before and gather the detection statistics for each malware detector. This
analysis will let us understand the workings of a particular malware detector and help
us identify the best detector for Android. Once we have that information, we will
know the best way to defeat obfuscation in malicious programs.
The detection rates for the AVG Antivirus are shown in Figure 12. From the
figure, we can see that this Antivirus behaves in a manner that is consistent with
the observations so far. The detection rates for AVG Antivirus are in line with the
collective detection rates obtained for all the malware detectors. AVG performs very
poorly only against the manifest obfuscator. In addition to this, the only other instance
when this malware detector fares poorly is when all the obfuscators are combined.
Similar to the detection rates observed for the AVG antivirus, we look at the
detection rates for the BitDefender, and the TrendMicro antivirus as well. The
performance of the BitDefender Antivirus is showing in Figure 13.
33
Figure 12: Detection Ratio for AVG Antivirus
Figure 13: Detection Ratio for the BitDefender Antivirus
The BitDefender Antivirus program behaves in a manner that is consistent with
the results obtained for all the malware detectors in general. The difference observed
with AVG antivirus is not seen with BitDefender. However, it can be seen that the
BitDefender antivirus still fails against the combination of all the obfuscators.
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Figure 14: Detection Ratio for the TrendMicro Antivirus
The TrendMicro Antivirus performs well only against unobfuscated malware samples,
as seen in Figure 14. The performance of this antivirus is consistently poor across all
the obfuscators. We can surmise that the algorithm being employed by the TrendMicro
antivirus is not very effective against obfuscated Android malware.
It is safe to conclude that the detection algorithms of AVG and BitDefender
are much more efficient against obfuscated malware, than the algorithm used by the
TrendMicro program.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion and Future Work
From the results obtained in this experiment it is evident that the malware detectors
of today are incapable of handling code obfuscation in android malware. This problem
presents a huge gap in the domain of Android Anit-Virus products. The first step in
building a robust malware detector for the Android operating system is to identify the
flaws in the current implementation of the malware detectors. To be able to identify
truly polymorphic malware, the anti virus programs need to be able to defeat the
different types of obfuscators and their combinations. From this experiment, it is
evident that the current malware detectors can be easily defeated and the only true
defense against mobile malware is at the point of installation.
8.1 Conclusion
Due to the limited processing capacity of the mobile devices, it is imperative that
stand alone malware detectors are able to sufficiently defend against known threats
and variants of known malware that are detectable by signature scanning. In this
experiment, we used different obfuscators to test the resilience of malware detectors
against obfuscated malware. Unsurprisingly, the malware detectors fared very poorly
against such obfuscation techniques.
We also observed that by applying all the obfuscators, it is becomes a trivial task
to defeat a very large number of obfuscators. While certain obfuscators, such as
the Lib obfuscator (explained in chapter 5 and results included in appendix C), do
not contribute much to the detection mechanism, some other obfuscators contribute
heavily to the detection algorithm. From the experiments, it is evident that the
manifest obfuscator, as shown in Figure 8, contributes the most to the malware
classification algorithm in most of the malware detectors. The importance of this
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Figure 15: Part of an obfuscated Manifest file
Figure 16: Part of a normal Manifest file
obfuscator can be gauged from the fact that this obfuscator gave better results than
the combination of four other combined obfuscators 9. A part of an obfuscated sample
manifest file is shown in Figure 15. A normal, unobfuscated sample of the same
manifest file is shown in Figure 16. As can be observed, a simple switching of the
values in the manifest file is enough to defeat the malware detectors. This leads to
the conclusion that the selection of the obfuscators to use could greatly determine the
detection chances for a malicious file.
Irrespective of the contribution of an individual obfuscator, combining the maximum
number of obfuscators leads to significantly lower detection rates. Therefore, the
higher the number of obfuscations employed, the lower the chance for a malware
getting detected. The current generation of malware detectors are incapable of
handling encryption in the body of malware. This experiment reiterates this fact and
supports the conclusions drawn by Preda et al. in [17]. The conclusions drawn by
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them indicating a huge gap in the requirement and the availability of sophisticated
anti-virus products is still very much prevalent.
8.2 Future Work
Similar to the obfuscators employed in this experiment, it should be possible to
create ‘‘de-obfuscators’’ for Android files. It would be interesting to see the effect of
each de-obfuscator against the corresponding obfuscator that has been used here. If
employing such a de-obfuscator helps in thwarting the obfuscation, then it could form
the basis for developing more generic de-obfuscation algorithms for incorporation into
malware detectors. As was evident from the experiment, the selection of the right
obfuscator could greatly influence the detection rate. This proves that the majority
of the malware detectors place too much of significance on one aspect of a file, for
classifying it. This shortcoming with the malware detectors for Android should be
taken care of.
The detection mechanism employed in this experiment was employed various
statistical methods. The experiment could be repeated with different datasets and
with different dynamic detection methods. If dynamic detection mechanisms are able
to defeat the obfuscators, they could be used to accumulate data over a large set of
samples to create a library of known malware. This library could then be utilized
by malware detectors that have very less processing power for performing dynamic
analysis. The ease of decompiling and compiling APK files makes it an easy target
for malware writers. If access to the source code of antivirus products are provided,
defense mechanisms against such obfuscation techniques can be built in. With our
increasing dependence on mobile phones and their proliferation into our lives, it is of
utmost importance that sophisticated malware detectors are able to handle obfuscated
malware.
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With these conclusions, we hope to make future malware detectors more resilient
against polymorphic virus with the expectation that the creators of the anti virus
software incorporate the necessary changes to their programs.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix 1
A.1 Abbreviations and Terminologies Used
• APK - A file format used for installing applications on the Android operating
system.
• AAMO - Short for Another Android Malware Obfuscator - A program for
applying obfuscators to android files.
• Obfuscator - A small program that scrambles the source code of a program to
make its functions less obvious.
• Apktool - A program that is used to decompile and compile APK files.
• Smali -
1. An assembler/disassemble for the dex format used by Android’s virtual
operating system.
2. An intermediate file type between compiled dex code and java source
code.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix 2
B.1 Malware File to Symbol Mapping
Label Filename
A 00d430877eed07d10c1e730926dcca9f82f282af
B 00e74c118fa3902e5c85fd8e37f3d084
C
08061663E638B5AC1D780CAACBE9FAD8_1074178_370436_GlamorousS
moke
D 0cbcfbebfb33fde66c282fec0248b0d99a829eab
E 0cc2c8461c78394b186a599c2d5baad364fb41c7
F 0D28FA54F9C0D41801E8FB5A7B0433DD
G 0e8236ddb163e7f3816cfef38b92c6e064887b3f
H 0ef158c897f91a58aa2a13d25cd3019bc19b9954
I 11A7767BFE4926458EC84385214B82C9
J 1485F498084F963801ED76013749C9FA
K 153c94a6d464497b07f1ea3511b87206a3621efd
L 156790b2ef37080cdc301324fa3f5a28d4c310d3
M 1F68ADDF38F63FE821B237BC7BAABB3D_IBanking_Chase
N 232e08bda4856b56e06a45ac5c27350fb30ddf5c
O
2C3B92FFE8123611AE9D9BED000C99F7_1074807_371216__3dtimeclockt
icks
P 2D66D7942148DE2D9F08EAB403921C89
Q 314d66e71040b36ba63ad5a376647dd63ecf3a5c
R 3E076979644672A0EF750A4C3226F553_assassins_creed
S 4021A1E00B3ABEE730994F1EE17219B4
T 4084939A0864B645F6C6A915586FB1AB_com.gmdcd.pic_1345165918398
U 40F3F16742CD8AC8598BF859A23AC290
V 4A300481411AB1992467959491DF412C
W 4D13D1BC63026B9C26C7CD4946B1BAE0_com.bntsxdn.pic
X 4d3a1a769255402be23ae5e6b3445d79b7b4b702
Y 4e80480daf4ab573121d839c2c74cc845945be38
Z 4FD1194F8127439609319CDBE244C0A7_1074349_370686__BlueArt
AA 55d716895ea0934c4a91e1e2cfbd682dec30cb2f
AB 55e2a4d0d89bc70e84159385ed9f078c5d7d9947
AC 561b37c04e92e1a4aadbc51138c787863408a014
AD 564431a34d65836481741ed83d6cb21c9a9bb7ba
AE 56b70b6d31dc3315cdd3b448416f2e2704a1ab25
AF 574e59a377b696c4bdfb83d4bef5478891c000e0
43
AG 57e8901381a4e9de94b26f458499c49051b19af2
AH 57f21111f6da9fb9a18af88dff688e59e8e24156
AI
58E73A03025BA95337C952223F18F479_1074703_371102__lordssacredheav
enlycross
AJ 598df80d1d5279e3204ef023dd4dbbe08be6bbd9
AK 5a37e9dd95ffaaae0c29197d2b45fd2afdf77f05
AL 5af738a737ce7ab4005505ab9ca43b08d4e3b503
AM 5c325c70250cbd294fae4cb321b3d8d39f1c1cd3
AN 5c53c9e54294250c0318c35086523449fa917f5c
AO 5cd906b76a1c15373bc7a0ed0d24ef69f84b2c28
AP 5cddd6f6585b0dff93ce1ecc6d8680e83c61e5b3
AQ 5d42e63a02548c15801c2da5b16cbcfb33c4230b
AR 5e9a4e1bb7fb4c94bceef4cd2af54bddaf1f1c34
AS 5f0b8bb59061451a5e45241858c3f8ac62569371
AT 5f0ba094e83ee321b331a3acd7252ae92b4d5734
AU 5fdcb3d86a949d73ddbf721640733917dc300d41
AV 60761527bdec07e7cf5fc35c8aaccf4de7617649
AW 60b1c98fc6ca2b86fbd7c772dc08a73e
AX 60b4ef7037ca6a4d1ee7e3c35c8e27d7
AY 6107f1f26bcd78b628f80e4531998c4b9444ca77
AZ 613398fef32a47a195ae493c8e635ceab6f4fcbd
BA 6214285ed81d3209d4947efe3a2291034877d417
BB 6260c6ba44308c0c4610468784b055ad69fa1095
BC 62bf7ab29610d47737ce01b9becbf4f56651e367
BD 62f6d3b57f0bcea6b9edebff7d67b4a1fb7ece7d
BE 634283bcea6d075b157b76a5f88d23cee733fcb7
BF 63616b5ed2253761c3e9aa47bc155a1743ac9a6f
BG 637d93c7c4d63b5c5d292c24a4a3ddff0f89cb99
BH 6386ea80441002cbfd69fd8ab74b7921d4378abb
BI 63e46c5c180d9b83a5866e770df00cadcc746e6a
BJ 63fc9581928251540df5a811eb20b9024065fcc9
BK 6414962b8bdc09247d92c1317a3e0aa31a973de2
BL 64a8be553cd05c4ac08738df819f231fc16b4b6c
BM 65324abd9ceb8166487d756f474c04ab618b5c30
BN 654d374da14a9edb95f85651be60e1888f237b98
BO 6594767af663113e6c46d2a3ede5d87ec1d034ee
BP 6599cffb03d95b07dafe8e1be726b160d7541c33
BQ 65d40b7b0e9eda5d5a209f3d34ed93357289dafe
BR 65f66e7b862db8c23074da1c2fe697d594ca1cdc
44
BS 661cc12f341af0120fbe74b33a8bc4863cae37b9
BT 667a3d0763101b1494c981fbdb9f6f18a41ecabc
BU 669f41369d3bfa56439e7fb6ef01a4a36e08729c
BV 6726709a16a54d457a8d4da73cc45bc5295d7168
BW 676d73270dfd198a8d7867e1df243dbb9b0e102e
BX 69B9691A8274A17CDC22E9681B3E1C74
BY 69be497da755a8259af5cdeda4ac0c9de67a81e2
BZ 6a6176fc043b821b1ceb48425f2bce9c1f3a6cb8
CA 6b26dd8548bad85e2b4bbf2650dc3c5879abc029
CB 6BAE149BC65576831AC635A23938BE36_smartphone5-1
CC 6bb6b3143790f0870f39e80cd3d6bd78fb3a9a57
CD 6c0b900a17faf11d9efc68951b2d04fdb180bfe8
CE 6c13a359586f9cab20f2bc9b4fd8294e61e6e852
CF 6c93ef2106647eb9e9322de5d106ae9df6146277
CG 6d02439c416349545211e382bc0f27b2383123f1
CH 6d43b3bc85770fafeb598eb5297bc341
CI 6d6b779ea0b3d31c9453db8268b1e85463fe4725
CJ 6db96e8a52382fa6f2d3220b592d7ae92f1d78f2
CK 6dba2c4cc420d3c43067cd0f8a86e1718f9639cb
CL 6dbef6bf711c74227550da5a033a0ae4c4c1c1cb
CM 727a33c78e4329ee5e1586a13ee867132790e436
CN 737395cf1bccbc23531fb109b4a8ee1e8cce26b4
CO 73ff558ea62c0835761eced6b292cc930728cf43
CP 74333980ae5bafcb25a9031fb46275435cdbba2e
CQ 749ff6f09b3b6de044ddadf447860b7fd63d8672
CR 74d9dc5a2c95e9eaa880ec11a32d9b109794474b
CS 75459a5009bf08067a1e15ee4e2992c23e00433c
CT 75f31fe1a07986080b6a6f4cd2d9347cc72201b4
CU 761c6c36d81c1edd9e0645447a4e638d7d88356e
CV 766a65fe6d1e4be4551d7d30a1b4539f19991e0e
CW 76f3739c16fb978eafde4ebfae105dc8a94731a5
CX 780b5f7c07ab98de7d8d07eed781973a415ebc5d
CY 780d5124b448249d948a60b43775a424634024ac
CZ 7828066c4804b6364a6f55b6aff3b657899a9d99
DA 792BBB3DDC46E3D0E640D32977434ACA
DB 7c0e0b1ca01e97c2f0d043eb0aabe61cae6216f7
DC 857ee29d88796e1f1b7b440dc9eadc77
DD 88870ad3c7bd42cfe1d728b4a4ccc104
DE 8D52070201F2A81FB1298E133D74057C
DF 8d574d94ba9445979723cfc810637fd84d4c06e1
45
DG 8F7A41A921FC15F4FD47A33E476D7B3B_1074179_370437__SkullLighter
DH 9C9AFD6B77D8D3A66A2DB2D2CF0B94B3
DI 9d1625aa79b55a79064dac7a0ecc2f91
DJ A31245022C60FC50B81F7FFC4F4967B2_com.hxmv696.pic
DK A4D6033F66DA3BE83CBF80724CA013D1
DL Activator
DM alfasafe
DN Alsalah
DO Android.Beita_com.beita.contact_10953B741D166D9E22937FE00FBF1038
DP Android.Core.Defender
DQ android.dds.com-STiNiTER
DR Android.Hehe_1CAA31272DAABB43180E079BCA5E23C1
DS Angry_BirdTransformers_1.1.0
DT apk
DU atticlab.bodyscanner
DV
B0E22A785041229A644F015472E738BA_1074810_371221__ghostiderfirefla
messremixFAMOUS3DAPPS
DW B2B7D5999DCE0559D13AB06D30C2C6EC
DX B6CACC0CF7BAD179D6BDE68F5C013E6E_xqxmn18
DY B8B434AB21D394DAA0A9A78A515BD517
DZ b9622e587ae28cfff8ffc5645221e422
EA BlackList_Pro_v2.8
EB btm
EC c1f9283b7ad8457160d3c189430f2c75
ED c2dfe44d9f130033ecd89ba33f8a2e0a
EE C424F9AD311F3B55F8DB5DABF6985856_Accutrack
EF C71740EE94467AE70A71265116D54186_com.zqbb1221.pic
EG c85d37585dbe2ad77572d9a27165ed63c9c8685e
EH caa04deff90081fd4b0b441b9bf16edeb05f52ee
EI CAFFFDEE7479A8816F4551AC8C3A0178
EJ carddeemamaAndroid
EK CCC01FD6D875B95E2AF5F270AAF8E842.576B9B86
EL cce1a35b5fee30883ea3ddca8312109691116cba
EM
CE7B9B2242A71BBEAC0B2839B1063013_1074139_370393__NoiseDetecto
rNonG
EN cenix.android.vbr
EO CFB7E66B2FB605CC94DEBD01238B4995
EP ch.smalltech.ledflashlight.free
46
EQ com.adobe.air
ER com.adobe.flashplayer
ES com.adobe.reader
ET com.advancedprocessmanager
EU com.alioth.imdevil_jp.DevilsCreed.full_1.8_installer
EV com.android.googledalvik
EW com.android.googlekernel
EX com.android.installer.full
EY com.android.locker
EZ com.android.Materialflow
FA com.anglefish.livewallpaper.hotchick1
FB com.antivirus
FC com software.compass
FD com.app.lotte.auth-1
FE com.appspot.swisscodemonkeys.jokes
FF com.appspot.swisscodemonkeys.paintfx
FG com.atools.cuttherope-LeNa.b
FH com.bb.iphone
FI com.biggu.shopsavvy
FJ com.c101421042723
FK com.cootek.smartinputv5
FL com.devuni.flashlight
FM com.droidmojo.awesomejokes
FN com.dropbox.android
FO com.ebay.mobile
FP com.estrongs.android.pop
FQ com.evernote.skitch
FR com.facebook.katana
FS com.facebook.orca
FT com.fdhgkjhrtjkjbx.model
FU com.fede.launcher
FV com.gau.go.launcherex
FW com.gau.go.launcherex.gowidget.taskmanager
FX com.gau.go.launcherex.theme.iphoneazooz
FY com.google.android.apps.maps
FZ com.google.android.apps.plus
GA com.google.android.apps.translate
GB com.google.android.stardroid
GC com.google.android.street
GD com.google.android.voicesearch
47
GE com.google.android.youtube
GF com.google.earth
GG com.google.zxing.client.android
GH com.hm
GI com.icq.mobile.client
GJ com.incredibleapp.wallpapershd
GK com.intsig.camscanner
GL com.jb.gosms
GM com.jiubang.goscreenlock
GN com.lovekamasutra.ikamasutralite
GO com.metago.astro
GP com.movieshow.down
GQ com.mxtech.videoplayer.ad
GR com.netbiscuits.kicker
GS com.nnew.GTAHDBackground
GT com.opera.browser
GU com.opera.mini.android
GV com.outfit7.talkingben
GW com.outfit7.talkinggina
GX com.outfit7.talkingsantafree
GY com.outfit7.talkingtom
GZ com.parental.control.v4
HA com.piviandco.fatbooth
HB com.qq.assistant
HC com.rechild.advancedtaskkiller
HD com.saavn.android
HE com.sancronringtones.funnysmssb
HF com.security.patch
HG com.skype.raider
HH com.splunchy.android.alarmclock
HI com.starfinanz.smob.android.sfinanzstatus
HJ com.stephbriggs5.batteryimprove-2
HK com.stylem.wallpapers
HL com.teamviewer.teamviewer.market.mobile
HM _com.tebs3.cuttherope_6_1.1.5
HN com.viber.voip
HO com.vlcdirect.vlcdirect
HP com.vlingo.client
HQ com.VoiceChange.VoiceChangeIL-1.4
HR com.watchtv
48
HS com.wetter.androidclient
HT com.whatsapp
HU com.whatsapp.wallpaper
HV copy9_23
HW ctm
HX
D67A07E3DE88C0130420588FD158B967_1074808_371217__eyeseeyouSA
MSUNG
HY d
HZ
DE5BFA8715DAC2E29E206C19CA98F2F4_1074141_370394__JingleBellN
onG
IA de.blitzer
IB de.cellular.tagesschau
IC de.dasoertliche.android
ID de.frauentausch.andreas
IE de.hafas.android.db
IF de.is24.android
IG de.kaufda.android
IH de.mehrmannd.sdbooster-GAMEX
II de.spiegel.android.app.spon
IJ de.tvspielfilm
IK de.web.mobile.android.mail
IL de.wutprobe211.de
IM dtm
IN E1B86054468D6AC1274188C0C579CCAF_iBanking
IO E8063DE12976D371441F15F2C5715627
IP e8237a583fe7b2362b4addf01518600b
IQ Extension.2nd.stage
IR F05839EB7156B434A893BBEDDB68AD85
IS F06AF629D33F17938849F822930AE428_iBanking_ing
IT F1AA24C1641471F5FBEF08AE56A53FB4
IU F1BC8520754D2AC4A920B3EF5C732380_iBanking_bot
IV F836F5C6267F13BF9F6109A6B8D79175_fbi
IW fakeAV_148B76C664F2854E2947AF01160FFA99_LabelReader
IX fakeAV_1CA532F171A0B765A46AF995EBAAB1D2_LabelReader
IY fakeAV_1E178E501B41659FFACE85153615DEA7_LabelReader
IZ fakeAV_36B177910C99872B33E90DEA71B16617_LabelReader
JA fakeAV_6F237D25472D9D09FC44ECE7DC9CED92_LabelReader
JB fakeAV_75B8F9DBB1CD79B7FC074F7F499150CF_LabelReader
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JC fakeAV_77BB7F86FB0AC66C97B1AB3573ADFFC1_LabelReader
JD fakeAV_934527F8EBB5C1088009CC9329DC3DE6_LabelReader
JE FAKEAV
JF fakeAV_ED1E0689F93B0C57E403489BB5338F59_LabelReader
JG Fakemart_.D002F0581A862373AA6C6C0070EC3156
JH FakeSMSInstaller_Geared_1.0.2
JI FB9FEFFB1FEF13C4A5E42ACE20183912_1074813_371228__SaveTenDollar
JJ flashplayer.android.update
JK GoogleKernel
JL hippo_sample
JM HtcLoggers
JN hu.tonuzaba.android
JO il.co.egv-3
JP instagram
JQ install
JR jin_old_2.1
JS kim
JT krep.itmtd.ywtjexf-1_02E231F85558F37DA6802142440736F6
JU kr.sira.measure
JV kr.sira.sound
JW la.droid.qr
JX live.photo.savanna
JY Loozfon_04C9E05D0F626CC3F47DC0BC9B65A8CF
JZ miyowa.android.microsoft.wlm
KA mms475843
KB net.uloops.android
KC net.zedge.android
KD Newfpwap_com_liveprintslivewallpaper
KE org.leo.android.dict
KF org.mozilla.firefox
KG PhoneLocator_Pro_4.6
KH _pl.byq.new_19_1.2.5
KI Ransomware-locker-67BDE6039310B4BB9CCD9FCF2A721A45_koler
KJ ru.blogspot.playsib.savageknife
KK SandroRat
KL santander
KM sb
KN sber
KO Scan-For-Viruses-Now
KP schgg
50
KQ smart.apps.droidcleaner-1
KR smart.apps.superclean-1
KS smtp_C9B7BE2C1518933950B0284FC254C485_20130802_031615
KT sp_k_test
KU sp_mtm
KV sp_ntm
KW spyera
KX SuiConFo
KY SuperClean-11
KZ suspect
LB test97
LC test98
LD test99
LE testService
LF ThreatJapan_4C937667CB23E857D42B664334E1142A_NewsAndroidcode03
LG ThreatJapan_BA73E96CAA95999321C1CDD766BDF58B_NewsAndroidcode02
LH ThreatJapan_CF45E1288B47D97326ED279F2EE41E4D_NewsAndroidcode01
LI ThreatJapan_D09A1FF8A96A6633B3B285F530E2D430_NewsAndroidnocode
LJ tunein.player
LK tvtotalnippeltrial.app
LL uk.co.exelentia.wikipedia
LM Update
LN vertu.jp
LO vertu.kr
LP vksafe
LQ waterfall3dLive.boa.liveWPcube
LR Whats_app
LS XXshenqi
LT zitmo
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APPENDIX C
Appendix C
C.1 Single Obfuscator Results
52
Figure C.17: Detection Rates before obfuscation. Average: 0.7138
Figure C.18: Average Detection Ratio after using All Obfuscators. Average: 0.219044
53
Figure C.19: Detection Rates after applying the Obfuscator Debug. Average: 0.478202
Figure C.20: Detection Rates after applying the Obfuscator Renaming. Average:
0.478202
54
Figure C.21: Detection Rates after applying the Obfuscator Resigned. Average:
0.507732
Figure C.22: Detection Rates after applying the Obfuscator Indirection. Average:
0.504374
55
Figure C.23: Detection Rates after applying the Obfuscator Lib. Average: 0.584618
Figure C.24: Detection Rates after applying the Obfuscator Manifest. Average:
0.386791
56
Figure C.25: Detection Rates after applying the Obfuscator Renaming, Reordering,
Goto, and Arithmetic Branch. Average: 0.403457
Figure C.26: Detection Rates after applying the Obfuscator Alignment. Average:
0.572892
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